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Article

Improving Consumer Protection: Lessons
from the 2008 Recession
Martha Coakley† & Alicia Daniel††
INTRODUCTION
In 2007, a home foreclosure crisis began which would ultimately drive the U.S. economy into the largest recession since
the Great Depression of the 1930s. State attorneys general (AGs)
saw the devastating effects of foreclosure on communities and
individual homeowners and stood at the forefront of addressing
this crisis. The AGs investigated ways to hold large banks and
investment giants accountable for their roles in the economic
downturn, and these AGs achieved important successes for their
respective states and for the nation as a whole. On the federal
level, the Dodd-Frank Act and other measures were enacted to
regulate financial institutions, whose recklessness had, in large
part, caused the foreclosure crisis and the resulting recession.1
Supporters of strong federal regulation argue that such regulation is necessary to ensure basic consumer protections. On the
other hand, opponents argue that such laws are nothing more
than unnecessary constraints on financial institutions.2 These
opponents, unfortunately, seem to have swiftly forgotten the lessons of the 2008 financial meltdown. By discussing the foreclosure crisis and subsequent crash from the perspective of a state
attorney general—a perspective that one of this Article’s authors
† Former Massachusetts Attorney General. Thanks to Peace Ibe, secondyear student at Boston University School of Law and integral member of our
authorship team, for her invaluable research and writing contributions. Copyright © 2019 by Martha Coakley.
†† Associate, Foley Hoag LLP. Copyright © 2019 by Alicia Daniel.
1. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L.
No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010).
2. See Ben Protess & Julie Hirschfeld Davis, Trump Moves to Roll Back
Obama-Era Financial Regulations, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 3, 2017), https://www
.nytimes.com/2017/02/03/business/dealbook/trump-congress-financial
-regulations.html.
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personally held during the crisis—this Article hopes to fight back
against this political and economic amnesia.
This Article examines the steps U.S. attorneys general took
to achieve and maintain effective consumer financial protections. Part I briefly summarizes the foreclosure crisis and the
factors that contributed to the economic downturn. Part II outlines states’ legal action and legislative solutions in response to
the foreclosure crisis, highlighting the nationwide state-federal
settlement. Part III examines the Massachusetts HomeCorps
program, a multi-faceted initiative designed to prevent unnecessary foreclosures. Finally, Part IV considers the current state of
consumer financial protection, including post-crisis federal regulation and the possible weakening of those laws under the current administration. Part V discusses the need for consumer
safeguards and the necessary relationship between the federal
government and state AGs to maintain the safeguards.
I. A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF THE FORECLOSURE CRISIS
Across the country, more than 5 million people lost their
homes to foreclosure during the crisis.3 Generally, American federal housing policy comprises Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae (government-sponsored entities), the Federal Housing Administration, and mortgage tax deductions.4 By supporting this policy,
the federal government allowed homeowners and buyers to have
better access to credit and loan products. During the early to
mid-2000s, high-risk mortgages became available to high-risk
borrowers.5 Beginning in 1998, the federal government steadily
chipped away at financial regulations, allowing even lenders insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) to
engage in unsustainable, high-stakes gambling for the sake of
short-term profit.6 As a result, the number of subprime loans—
that is, loans available to borrowers with poor credit scores7—
3. MASS. OFFICE ATTORNEY GEN., REBUILDING THE COMMONWEALTH: RECOVERING FROM THE FORECLOSURE CRISIS AND SETTING THE FOUNDATION FOR
FUTURE SUCCESS 5 (Apr. 2014), https://www.mass.gov/files/documents/2016/08/
oz/homecorps-report.pdf.
4. N. ERIC WEISS & KATIE JONES, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., AN OVERVIEW
OF THE HOUSING FINANCE SYSTEM IN THE UNITED STATES 1 (2017), https://fas
.org/sgp/crs/misc/R42995.pdf.
5. Steve Denning, Lest We Forget: Why We Had a Financial Crisis, FORBES
(Nov. 22, 2011), https://www.forbes.com/sites/stevedenning/2011/11/22/5086/
#1ef34a3bf92f.
6. Id.
7. See Jeff Cox, Big Banks Have Found a New Way to Stay in the Subprime
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nearly doubled from 2003 to 2005.8 Consumers’ access to credit
dramatically increased, including that of homebuyers who were
previously unable to obtain mortgages (often because of faulty
credit history or lack of a down payment).9
Unmonitored and unregulated companies issued a tremendous amount of risky debt, knowing that if the housing market
did not continue to climb, the mortgages they issued would
surely end in default. Almost immediately, the inevitable happened. Home prices stalled in 2005, then dropped the following
year.10 Owners stopped making mortgage payments due to increased interest and because they now owed more on these mortgages than their properties were worth.11 Lenders’ and investors’
mortgage loss rates skyrocketed.12 Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae,
who had issued debt to fund purchases of these high-risk mortgages, suffered losses due to the failing mortgages.13 The federal
government seized these two entities in the summer of 2008 and
placed them into a conservatorship that the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA) ran.14
The foreclosure crisis affected the entire U.S. economy. It
lowered construction rates, affected consumer interests, and paralyzed financial firm lending.15 Ultimately, the crisis spiraled
into the 2008 global financial meltdown. State AGs first tried to
fight the crisis within their own state bounds, which proved
largely ineffective against national and international financial
institutions. Therefore, AGs started to work together to begin an
intensive investigation and ultimately negotiate the largest joint
state-federal settlement in history.
Lending Business, CNBC (Apr. 10, 2018), https://www.cnbc.com/2018/04/10/big
-banks-have-found-a-new-way-to-stay-in-the-subprime-lending-business.html.
8. Christopher Mayer et al., The Rise in Mortgage Defaults, 23 J. ECON.
PERSP. 27, 36 (2009).
9. Id. at 48.
10. Denning, supra note 5.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. MARTIN NEIL BAILY ET AL., INST. ON BUS. & POLICY AT BROOKINGS, THE
OBSTACLES OF THE FINANCIAL CRISIS (2008), https://www.brookings.edu/wp
-content/uploads/2016/06/11_origins_crisis_baily_litan.pdf; Neil Irwin & Zachary A. Goldfarb, U.S. Seizes Control of Mortgage Giants, WASH. POST (Sept. 8,
2008), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/09/07/
AR2008090700259.html.
15. John V. Duca, Subprime Mortgage Crisis, FED. RES. BANK (Nov. 22,
2013), https://www.federalreservehistory.org/essays/subprime_mortgage_
crisis.

2480

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[103:2477

II. ATTORNEYS’ GENERAL EFFORTS IN HOLDING
LENDERS ACCOUNTABLE FOR THE FORECLOSURE
CRISIS
State AGs were among the first responders to the burgeoning foreclosure crisis, and Massachusetts was on the front lines.
In 2007, the Massachusetts Attorney General’s Office (MA Office) released a summary report describing the newly enacted
consumer protection regulations governing mortgage lenders
and brokers entitled The American Dream Shattered: The Dream
of Homeownership and the Reality of Predatory Lending.16 The
report included a summary of statewide hearings addressing
proposed mortgage regulations from September of that year.17 It
also included an analysis of resident and business concerns in
Massachusetts, as well as local, state, and federal officials considering remedies to address the foreclosure crisis.18 Also in
2007, the MA Office enacted emergency regulations which
barred “foreclosure rescue schemes”19—scams that targeted individuals whose homes were facing potential foreclosure, preying on desperate homeowners and stealing any home equity they
had.20 The report and the emergency regulations stressed the
need for stronger consumer protections to make the mortgagelending marketplace more transparent and fair.21
In February 2008, the Massachusetts Superior Court issued
the first order in the nation to prohibit a lender (in this case,
Fremont Investment & Loan and Fremont General Corporation)
from foreclosing on certain “[p]resumptively [u]nfair” mortgage
loans because the loans posed an unacceptable risk of default
and foreclosure.22 Fremont was issuing mortgages to borrowers
16. MASS. OFFICE ATTORNEY GEN., THE AMERICAN DREAM SHATTERED:
THE DREAM OF HOMEOWNERSHIP AND THE REALITY OF PREDATORY LENDING
(2007), https://archives.lib.state.ma.us/bitstream/handle/2452/113761/
ocn769685807.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y.
17. Id. at 15–22.
18. Id.
19. Legislative Solutions for Preventing Loan Modification and Foreclosure
Rescue Fraud: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Hous. & Cmty. Opportunity of
the Comm. on Fin. Serv., 111th Cong. 7 (2009) (statement of Martha Coakley,
Att’y Gen. of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts).
20. See STEVE TRIPOLI & ELIZABETH RENUART, NAT’L CONSUMER LAW
CTR., DREAMS FORECLOSED: THE RAMPANT THEFT OF AMERCANS’ HOMES
THROUGH EQUITY-STRIPPING FORECLOSURE “RESCUE” SCAMS (2005), https://
www.nclc.org/images/pdf/foreclosure_mortgage/scam/report-foreclosure-rescue
-scams-2005.pdf.
21. Id.
22. See Commonwealth v. Fremont Inv. & Loan, No. 07-4373-BLS1, 2008
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whose incomes could not support their mortgage payments, luring them in with a low introductory rate and then dramatically
increasing their monthly payments after a few years.23 Massachusetts alleged that these subprime mortgage loans violated
several state laws and were predatory because borrowers were
unlikely to be able to repay the loans.24 The court performed a
groundbreaking analysis of the risky mortgages that Fremont
and others lenders were issuing that contributed to the foreclosure crisis. The order described the factors that entrapped homeowners and led to innumerable foreclosures: low introductory
rates, which quickly became significantly higher; the use of the
introductory rates (not the permanent rates) to determine
whether borrowers’ incomes qualified them for the loans; and the
borrowers’ inability to refinance their mortgages because of prepayment penalties or high loan-to-value ratios on their homes.25
Where these conditions were present, the court recognized that
borrowers were effectively trapped in mortgages which Fremont
should have known they could not afford.26 Fremont was required to obtain approval from the attorney general or, if the attorney general did not grant approval, from the court, before
foreclosing upon mortgages.27 The Supreme Judicial Court upheld this decision in December of 2008.28 The superior court’s
analysis, as well as its apparent determination that the state enforcement in this area was not preempted by federal law, set the
stage for state AGs to become more active participants in holding
lenders accountable for the foreclosure crisis.
After the Fremont decisions, the MA Office sent letters to
four major lenders, Bank of America, J.P. Morgan Chase, Wells
Fargo, and Ally, calling upon them to cease foreclosures in light
of revelations regarding widespread foreclosure fraud in Massachusetts.29 When these lenders refused to address the MA Office’s consumer protection concerns, Massachusetts was the first
WL 517279, at *1 (Mass. Super. Ct. Feb. 26, 2008), aff ’ d, 847 N.E.2d. 548 (Mass.
2008).
23. Id.
24. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 183C, § 4 (2008).
25. See Fremont, 2008 WL 517279, at *1–17.
26. Finding Massachusetts was likely to succeed on the merits of its claim,
the court granted the Commonwealth’s motion for a preliminary injunction. Id.
at *16–17. The restriction remained in place pending final adjudication or further order of the court. Id. at *16.
27. See id. at *1.
28. Commonwealth v. Fremont Inv. & Loan, 897 N.E.2d 548, 562 (Mass.
2008).
29. See Diana Olick, First Major State Lawsuit Filed Over “Robo-Signing,”

2482

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[103:2477

state to take them to court for fraudulent foreclosure documentation processing.30 Of course, Massachusetts was not the only
place where these lenders were illegally foreclosing. These
abuses affected homeowners across the country.31 State AGs
faced an insurmountable task in waging separate battles against
various lending giants in an effort to get relief for their constituents.32 However, states working together in a multi-state investigation would have much more clout. Beginning in October
2010, Iowa Attorney General Tom Miller led a coalition of state
AGs in talks with numerous lenders that were accused of foreclosure fraud.33 These negotiations aimed to resolve allegations
that five of the country’s largest banks committed unlawful foreclosures, including the robo-signing of documents.34
The Justice Department and the Department of Housing
and Urban Development joined the state AGs, forging a unique
state and federal partnership to vindicate consumers.35 After
over a year of negotiations, the states finally reached an agreement with the lenders to hold the lenders accountable for their
role in the foreclosure crisis and subsequent meltdown, as well
as to provide meaningful relief for American homeowners.36 The
terms of the settlement—which was approved by the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia on April 4, 201237—required five major financial institutions (Bank of America, J.P.
CNBC (Dec. 1, 2011), https://www.cnbc.com/id/45511868; Jon Prior, Coakley
Promises Large Penalties for Robo-Signing, HOUSINGWIRE (Dec. 1, 2011),
https://www.housingwire.com/articles/coakley-promises-large-penalties-robo
-signing.
30. Olick, supra note 29.
31. Jeremiah S. Buckley, State Attorneys General Are the New Bank Regulators, AM. BANKER (Feb. 1, 2012), https://www.americanbanker.com/
opinion/state-attorneys-general-are-the-new-bank-regulators.
32. Id.
33. Jon Prior, Mortgage Servicers Sign $26 Billion Foreclosure Settlement,
HOUSINGWIRE (Feb. 9, 2012), https://www.housingwire.com/articles/mortgage
-servicers-sign-26-billion-foreclosure-settlement.
34. Cf. Carole Fleck, $25 Billion Deal Reached to Aid Distressed Homeowners, AARP (Feb. 8, 2012), https://www.aarp.org/money/credit-loans-debt/info-02
-2012/robo-signed-foreclosures.html (discussing the settlement). Robo-signing
is “a term used by consumer advocates to describe the signing of foreclosure or
bankruptcy by individuals with no knowledge of the facts underlying such documents.” Julia Kagan, Robo-Signer, INVESTOPEDIA (Feb. 25, 2018), https://www
.investopedia.com/terms/r/robo-signer.asp.
35. Prior, supra note 33.
36. Id.
37. National Mortgage Settlement, U.S. DEP’T JUST., https://www.justice
.gov/ust/national-mortgage-settlement (last updated Jan. 18, 2017).
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Morgan Chase, Citi, Wells Fargo, and Ally) to provide cash payments to states, and included other obligations such as injunctive relief going forward.38 The $25 billion settlement was the
largest joint federal-state civil settlement in history.39 The settlement’s structure included billions of dollars in direct payments to homeowners, payments to state and federal governments, and various new homeowner protections.40 The
agreement established new mortgage loan servicing and foreclosure standards, which created new consumer protections.41 The
standards of the agreement were focused on the need for transparency.42
As Illinois Attorney General Lisa Madigan indicated,
“[w]hile the settlement [was] a big step forward in our efforts, it
[was] not the end.”43 The national settlement was a starting
point for many AGs who, in their respective states, used the settlements for consumer relief. In Massachusetts, this innovative
attitude led to founding the HomeCorps program, which is described in the next Part.
III. NATIONAL SETTLEMENT GIVES RISE TO
MASSACHUSETTS’ HOMECORPS PROGRAM
More than 45,000 people in Massachusetts lost their homes
to foreclosure during the crisis.44 The national mortgage settlement guaranteed Massachusetts residents $318 million in assistance, $44.5 million of which was paid directly to the state.45 Using the remaining funds from the national state-federal
mortgage foreclosure settlement, the Massachusetts Attorney
General’s Office launched HomeCorps, a statewide foreclosure
38. Joseph A. Smith Jr., A Review and Assessment of the National Mortgage
Settlement by Its Monitor, 21 N.C. BANKING INST. 29, 31–32 (2017) (discussing
the obligations the Servicers agreed to in exchange for a release from liability).
39. Federal Government and State Attorneys General Reach $25 Billion
Agreement with Five Largest Mortgage Servicers to Address Mortgage Loan Servicing and Foreclosure Abuses, U.S. DEP’T JUST. (Feb. 9, 2012), https://www
.justice.gov/opa/pr/federal-government-and-state-attorneys-general-reach-25
-billion-agreement-five-largest.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Madigan, Federal Government & State Attorneys General Secure $25
Billion Settlement with Nation’s Five Largest Banks, ILL. ATT’Y GEN. (Feb. 9,
2012), http://www.illinoisattorneygeneral.gov/pressroom/2012_02/20120209
.html.
44. MASS. OFFICE ATTORNEY GEN., supra note 3, at 7.
45. Id. at 18.
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prevention and borrower support initiative.46 The goal of HomeCorps was to mitigate current and future impacts of the foreclosure crisis by providing relief to individual borrowers in Massachusetts who were facing foreclosure.47 HomeCorps also set the
foundation for future economic and consumer success.48
Another element of HomeCorps was the HomeCorps Grant
Funding Initiative, a system of grant programs collectively
worth more than $26 million.49 This initiative provided funds to
organizations and programs that supported housing recovery efforts.50 The grants were devoted to providing legal representation for distressed borrowers, supporting foreclosed residents
looking for new places to live, and identifying and responding to
neighborhoods with high foreclosure rates and abandoned
homes.51 Through the Abandoned Housing Initiative, the MA Office, with Massachusetts cities and towns, encouraged willing
delinquent owners to repair their homes and obtain security.52
The MA Office worked with the relevant courts to eliminate the
health and safety risks the abandoned homes posed by bringing
the properties up to sanitary code.53
In 2011, State Senator Karen Spilka, State Representative
Steven Walsh, and Attorney General Martha Coakley filed Massachusetts House Bill 4323: An Act Preventing Unlawful and
Unnecessary Foreclosures.54 This bill mandated loan modifications to certain high-risk home mortgages when such modifications were in the financial interest of the borrower and the
lender.55 It provided the parties an opportunity to modify these
loans so that the borrower could afford the monthly payments
and the lender would not have to foreclose on the home and sell
it at a loss.56 The bill also required that foreclosing entities provide documentation of the chain of mortgage assignments back
to the original mortgagee, proving their legal right to foreclose.57
46. Id. at 19.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 32.
53. Id.
54. 2012 Mass. Acts 973.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Massachusetts House Bill 4323: An Act Preventing Unlawful and Unnecessary Foreclosures, SALTER MCGOWAN SYLVIA & LEONDARD, https://www
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Then-governor Deval Patrick signed the bill into law on August
3, 2012.58 The new law paired well with HomeCorps’ goal of mitigating future impacts of the foreclosure crisis by providing advocacy to distressed borrowers in Massachusetts facing foreclosure.59 To achieve this goal, HomeCorps increased the number of
loan modification specialists to ensure distressed borrowers receive adequate support.60
Following the launch of HomeCorps, Massachusetts’ foreclosure rates largely stayed below national averages and, as a general matter, the Massachusetts housing market began recovering quicker than most other states at the time.61 By 2014,
HomeCorps recovered more than $850 million from seventeen
national banks and lenders, which was provided to Massachusetts homeowners and investors and used in efforts to further
consumer protection from foreclosure fraud and to keep residents in their homes.62
The efforts to strengthen consumer protections continued after the state-federal settlement. Many state AGs launched their
own initiatives and steadfastly prosecuted mortgage fraud
cases.63 Meanwhile, federal legislators were busy enacting laws
geared towards consumer protection to keep borrowers from abusive lending and mortgage practices, as described in the next
Part.
IV. THE CURRENT STATE OF CONSUMER PROTECTION
In 2010, Congress enacted the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank).64 This law
placed regulations on the financial industry and was enacted as
a means to “promote the long-term sustainability of the U.S. financial system.”65 To achieve this goal, Dodd-Frank created sev-

.smsllaw.com/massachusetts-house-bill-4323-an-act-preventing-unnecessary
-and-unlawful-foreclosures (last visited Apr. 16, 2019).
58. H.R. 4323, 2012 Leg., 207th Sess. (Mass. 2012).
59. MASS. OFFICE ATTORNEY GEN., supra note 3, at 24.
60. Id. at 19.
61. Id. at 7.
62. Id.
63. Buckley, supra note 31.
64. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L.
No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010).
65. Mary Jo White, Statement on the Anniversary of the Dodd-Frank Act,
SEC (July 16, 2015), https://www.sec.gov/news/statement/statement-on-the
-anniversary-of-the-dodd-frank-act.html.
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eral agencies and councils. Among these agencies was the Consumer and Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB).66
The CFPB was established to protect consumers from financial institutions’ illegal and harmful practices.67 Before the
CFPB was created, several agencies shared the responsibility of
enforcing federal consumer financial protection laws.68 The various agencies in place prior to Dodd-Frank and during the financial crisis included the Federal Reserve Board of Governors; the
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation; the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency; the Office of Thrift Supervision; the National Credit Union Administration; the Federal Trade Commission; and the Department of Housing and Urban Development.69
Each of these agencies focused on regulating a particular type of
institution, but none were solely devoted to consumer protection.70
After the crisis, these agencies were individually inadequate
to repair the economy and protect consumers, which led to Dodd
Frank and the CFPB.71 The CFPB’s creation consolidated responsibility for consumer protection to a single enforcer. In a
blog post summarizing the CFPB’s mission, Senator Elizabeth
Warren (at the time, Assistant to the President and Special Advisor to the Treasury Secretary)72 noted the need for the consumer bureau on the basis that “people ought to be able to read
their credit card and mortgage contracts and know the deal.”73
66. Daniel Bush, What Is the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, Anyway?, PBS NEWS HOUR (Nov. 27, 2017), https://www.pbs.org/newshour/
economy/making-sense/what-is-the-consumer-financial-protection-bureau
-anyway.
67. Id.
68. CFPB, BUILDING THE CFPB: A PROGRESS REPORT 9 (July 18, 2011),
https://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/2011/07/Report_BuildingTheCfpb1.pdf.
69. BAIRD WEBEL, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., THE DODD-FRANK WALL
STREET REFORM AND CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT: BACKGROUND AND SUMMARY 11 (Apr. 21, 2017), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R41350.pdf.
70. CFPB, supra note 68, at 8.
71. Martin Neil Bailey et al., The Impact of the Dodd-Frank Act on Financial Stability and Economic Growth, 3 RUSSELL SAGE FOUND. J. SOC. SCI. 20,
29–30 (2017) (stating that the creation of the CFPB consolidated the oversight
of seven different agencies, “leaving fewer gaps in the regulatory infrastructure”).
72. Jackie Calmes & Sewell Chan, Obama Picks Warren to Set Up Consumer Bureau, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 17, 2010), https://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/
18/us/politics/18warren.html.
73. Elizabeth Warren, Fighting to Protect Consumers, WHITEHOUSE.GOV
(Sept. 17, 2010), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/blog/2010/09/17/
fighting-protect-consumers.
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Senator Warren and President Obama intended for the CFPB to
“level[] the playing field” between consumers and the consumer
credit market.74
In its efforts to achieve this goal and hold financial institutions accountable, the CFPB has handled over 1 million consumer complaints and has created an efficient platform for consumers to file their complaints.75 The CFPB has recovered over
12 billion dollars in consumer relief by enforcing federal consumer financial laws and holding financial service providers answerable for their actions.76 For example, the CFPB fined Wells
Fargo $100 million (the largest penalty the CFPB has ever imposed) “for the widespread illegal practice of secretly opening unauthorized deposit and credit card accounts,”77 and sued CitiBank subsidiaries for failing to provide full disclosure to
consumers applying for foreclosure relief.78
Critics have fervently scrutinized the CFPB, despite the results the agency has achieved on behalf of consumers.79 Scholars
have examined the agency’s broad authority and discretion, its
immunity from congressional oversight and presidential influence, and its protection from judicial interference.80 Many have
argued that these factors demonstrate the agency’s unconstitutionality, meaning that the agency lacks the authority to take

74. Id.
75. Gretchen Morgenson, The Watchdog Protecting Consumers May Be Too
Effective, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 10, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/10/
business/consumer-financial-protection-bureau-gretchen-morgenson.html.
76. CFPB, https://www.consumerfinance.gov (last updated June 4, 2018).
77. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau Fines Wells Fargo $100 Million
for Widespread Illegal Practice of Secretly Opening Unauthorized Accounts,
CFPB (Sept. 8, 2016), https://www.consumerfinance.gov/about-us/newsroom/
consumer-financial-protection-bureau-fines-wells-fargo-100-million
-widespread-illegal-practice-secretly-opening-unauthorized-accounts.
78. Enforcement Actions, CFPB, https://www.consumerfinance.gov/policy
-compliance/enforcement/actions/ (last visited Apr. 16, 2019).
79. Jackie Wattles & Matt Egan, Why Wall Street and Republicans Hate
the CFPB, CNN MONEY (Nov. 27, 2017), https://money.cnn.com/2017/11/25/
news/wall-street-elizabeth-warren-consumer-financial-protection-bureau/
index.html.
80. See, e.g., William Simpson, Above Reproach: How the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau Escapes Constitutional Checks & Balances, 36 REV.
BANKING & FIN. L. 343, 345 (2016) (examining the agency’s “self-funding structure . . . coupled with its unique independent status exempt from much executive and congressional oversight”).
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enforcement actions. This debate has been the subject of frequent litigation in which defendants counterclaim, questioning
the constitutionality of the CFPB.81
In PHH Corp. v. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, the
D.C. Circuit concluded that the federal statute providing the
CFPB Director with a five-year term in office, subject to removal
by the President only for “inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office,” is consistent with Article II of the Constitution.82
Article II mandates that the President of the United States
“take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.”83 In discussing
the reasons that Congress initially established the CFPB, the
court found the power vested in the CFPB analogous to the powers vested in the independent Federal Trade Commission.84 The
court relied on an earlier Supreme Court case, Humphrey’s Executor v. United States,85 to validate the design and structure of
independent agencies, including the unique structure of the
CFPB.86
Nevertheless, the current administration has dissolved
many of the rules enacted after the financial crisis, including
making significant changes to the CFPB structure.87 Senator
Warren noted in an interview that, “[o]n the 10th anniversary of
an enormous financial crash, Congress should not be passing
81. Eric Pearson, A Brief Essay on the Constitutionality of the Consumer
Financial Protection Bureau, 47 CREIGHTON L. REV. 99, 104–22 (2013) (discussing the structure and constitutionality of the Consumer Financial Protection
Bureau).
82. PHH Corp. v. CFPB, 881 F.3d 75, 80 (D.C. Cir. 2018).
83. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
84. PHH Corp., 881 F.3d at 92–94 (“Congress validly decided that the
CFPB needed a measure of independence and chose a constitutionally acceptable means to protect it. . . . [T]he CFPB’s function is remarkably similar to that
of the FTC, a consumer protection agency that has operated for more than a
century with the identical for-cause protection, approved by a unanimous Supreme Court.”).
85. 295 U.S. 602 (1935).
86. PHH Corp., 881 F.3d at 78. However, a New York court reached a conflicting result when it ruled the CFPB unconstitutional in 2018. CFPB v. RD
Legal Funding, LLC, 332 F. Supp. 3d 729, 784 (S.D.N.Y. 2018).
87. See Robert O’Harrow, Jr. et al., How Trump Appointees Curbed a Consumer Protection Agency Loathed by the GOP, WASH. POST (Dec. 4, 2018),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/investigations/how-trump-appointees-curbed
-a-consumer-protection-agency-loathed-by-the-gop/2018/12/04/3cb6cd56-de20
-11e8-aa33-53bad9a881e8_story.html?utm_term=.42e738cde2f2 (“One year after Mulvaney’s arrival, he and his political aides have constrained the agency
from within . . . . Mulvaney and a team of political appointees used the levers of
government to hinder career employees and roll back oversight of private industry.”).
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laws to roll back regulations on Wall Street banks.”88 Yet this is
exactly what Congress and the executive branch have been doing. In May 2018, Congress passed the Economic Growth, Regulatory Relief, and Consumer Protection Act (the Act).89 The Act
authorizes federal regulators to narrow or eliminate many of the
regulations Dodd Frank created for banks, including liquidity
risk-management standards and supervisory requirements.90 In
November 2017, President Trump appointed a former congressman and director of the federal Office of Management and
Budget, Mick Mulvaney, as acting director of the CFPB.91 Mulvaney conducted various efforts to change the structure of the
CFPB, including changing the agency’s name to the Bureau of
Consumer Financial Protection (BCFP).92 In June 2018, he fired
the BCFP’s entire twenty-five-member Consumer Advisory
Board93 pursuant to the restructured agency’s reformed mission
of “regularly identifying and addressing outdated, unnecessary,
or unduly burdensome regulations.”94
88. Erica Werner & Damian Paletta, 10 Years After Financial Crisis, Senate Prepares to Roll Back Banking Rules, WASH. POST (Mar. 4, 2018), https://
www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/10-years-after-financial-crisis
-senate-prepares-to-roll-back-banking-rules/2018/03/04/e6115438-1e37-11e8
-9de1-147dd2df3829_story.html.
89. Economic Growth, Regulatory Relief, and Consumer Protection Act, S.
2155, 115th Cong. (2018) (enacted), https://www.congress.gov/bill/115th
-congress/senate-bill/2155.
90. Samuel R. Woodall III et al., “Economic Growth, Regulatory Relief, and
Consumer Protection Act” Is Enacted, PROGRAM ON CORP. COMPLIANCE & ENFORCEMENT N.Y.U. (June 5, 2018), https://wp.nyu.edu/compliance_
enforcement/2018/06/05/economic-growth-regulatory-relief-and-consumer
-protection-act-is-enacted.
91. Court Decision Leaves White House’s Mulvaney in Place as Acting Head
of CFPB, CNBC (Nov. 28, 2017), https://www.cnbc.com/2017/11/28/court
-decision-leaves-white-houses-mulvaney-in-place-as-acting-head-of-cfpb.html;
Mulvaney, Mick, BIOGRAPHICAL DIRECTORY U.S. CONGRESS, http://bioguide
.congress.gov/scripts/biodisplay.pl?index=M001182 (last visited Apr. 15, 2019).
92. See O’Harrow, supra note 87 (“Mulvaney adopted a new seal that
changed the agency’s name. The new name, Bureau for Consumer Financial
Protection, scrambled a widely used acronym that the agency had spent tens of
millions of dollars to promote.”); Emily Stewart, Mick Mulvaney Changed the
CFPB’s Sign to BCFP, VOX (June 11, 2018), https://www.vox.com/policy-and
-politics/2018/6/11/17451292/mick-mulvaney-cfpb-bcfp.
93. Acting Director Mulvaney Fires Members of Advisory Board of Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, Endangering Financial Well-Being of
American Families, NAT’L CONSUMER L. CTR. (June 6, 2018), https://www.nclc
.org/media-center/mulvaney-fires-members-of-advisory-board.html.
94. Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection Issues Statement on the Implementation of the Economic Growth, Regulatory Relief, and Consumer Protection Act Amendments to the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act, CFPB (July 5, 2018),
https://www.consumerfinance.gov/about-us/newsroom/bureau-consumer
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V. WHAT AMERICANS NEED NOW
Now, ten years after the height of the 2008 financial crisis,
the United States is benefitting from the longest bull market in
its history.95 Banks are profitable again, and the housing and
stock markets are reaching record highs.96 Yet experts
acknowledge that in many respects, the 2008 crash’s damage is
permanent, and some worry that the economy may be headed for
another foreclosure crisis as banks begin eyeing new ways to
grant risky mortgages.97 As increases in the cost of rent far outpace the growth of wages,98 more people consider taking out unwise mortgages as an alternative to renting, and banks are

-financial-protection-issues-statement-implementation-economic-growth
-regulatory-relief-and-consumer-protection-act-amendments-home-mortgage
-disclosure-act; see O’Harrow, supra note 87 (“On Dec. 21 [2017] . . . career employees took note of a subtle but significant change to language describing the
agency’s mission in news releases. In addition to protecting consumers, the bureau was now ‘regularly identifying and addressing outdated, unnecessary or
unduly burdensome regulations,’ the new language said.”).
95. Matt Egan, Market Milestone: This Is the Longest Bull Run in History,
CNN BUS. (Aug. 22, 2018), https://money.cnn.com/2018/08/22/investing/bull
-market-longest-stocks/index.html.
96. N.Y. Times Editorial Bd., Inviting the Next Financial Crisis,
N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 25, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/25/opinion/
economy-financial-crisis.html (“The housing market, once crippled by foreclosures, has sprung back to life . . . . Banks, once dependent on taxpayer dollars
to keep their doors open, are raking in profits.”); Adam Shell, S&P 500 Hits
Record High as Earnings Eclipse Trade War Fears, USA TODAY (Aug. 21,
2018), https://www.usatoday.com/story/money/2018/08/21/stocks-hit-record
-highs/922315002 (“The Standard & Poor’s 500 stock index, a broad gauge of the
U.S. stock market, hit a fresh all-time high . . . . [This] period of rising stock
prices . . . puts the large-company stock index on track Wednesday to eclipse the
1990’s bull market as the longest in history.”).
97. N.Y. Times Editorial Bd., supra note 96 (“The per capita gross domestic
product of the United States is about $70,000 smaller over the average person’s
lifetime than it would have been had the economy stayed on the trajectory it
had been before the crisis . . . . [T]he economy is ‘unlikely to regain’ that lost
ground, a stunning acknowledgment of the permanent and significant costs of
avoidable financial crises.”); Jorge Newbery, Are We Headed for Another Foreclosure Crisis?, FORBES (Dec. 8, 2017), https://www.forbes.com/sites/
forbesrealestatecouncil/2017/12/08/are-we-headed-for-another-foreclosure
-crisis/#40aa32875ecf (“Ten years later [after the Great Recession and the burst
of the U.S. housing bubble], low- or no-down-payment mortgages may be making a comeback. . . . [T]hey may herald a worrisome trend that could lead to a
repeat of our last housing crisis.”).
98. THE PEW CHARITABLE TRS., AMERICAN FAMILIES FACE A GROWING
RENT BURDEN 4 (Apr. 19, 2018), https://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and
-analysis/reports/2018/04/american-families-face-a-growing-rent-burden (noting “a rapid increase in rental market prices that has outpaced household incomes for many families”).
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scrambling to let them.99 More federal safeguards are disappearing by the day, leaving state AGs increasingly alone on the front
lines of consumer protection. Dodd-Frank gave state AGs the
power to enforce federal consumer protection regulations,
strongly resembling the CFPB’s power.100 The law acknowledged
what the experience of recovering from the 2008 meltdown had
taught: that both federal regulators and state AGs are more effective when they are able to coordinate.101 However, as federal
regulators grow ever more passive regarding consumer protection, state AGs are once again left to hold companies accountable
without support from the federal government. This is especially
concerning given that only a handful of enforcement actions have
ever been brought by state AGs under Dodd-Frank, and fewer
still have been a cooperative effort between states.102 There is a
growing enforcement gap, leaving consumers exposed to abuse
and the economy vulnerable to lenders’ illegal and destructive
practices.
To be sure, state AGs are powerful warriors in the fight
against financial disasters. The history of the national state-federal mortgage settlement shows that AGs can, and do, win meaningful victories for consumers.103 Moreover, residents of states
with protective regulations were better off than those in more
permissive states following the 2008 crash.104 However, both
then and now, state AGs are, by their very nature, unable to fully

99. See Newbery, supra note 97 (“Several private banks are now offering
various zero-down mortgage programs or down payment assistance programs
for higher-risk borrowers.”).
100. See Mark Totten, Credit Reform and the States: The Vital Role of Attorneys General After Dodd-Frank, 99 IOWA L. REV. 115, 128–36 (2013) (describing
“the concurrent-enforcement powers enjoyed by SAGs [state attorneys general]
under the Dodd-Frank Act”).
101. See supra Part II.
102. See AM. BAR ASS’N, STATE REGULATORS’ DODD-FRANK ENFORCEMENT
AUTHORITY: INITIAL SUITS AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS 2–4, http://apps
.americanbar.org/buslaw/committees/CL310000pub/newsletter/201510/fa_4
.pdf (cataloguing Dodd-Frank state attorneys general cases among seven states,
including two cooperative efforts).
103. See supra Part II.
104. See Dan Freed, Florida, Nevada Can’t Win for Losing on Mortgage Crisis, THESTREET (Aug. 6, 2014), https://www.thestreet.com/story/12832469/1/
florida-nevada-cant-win-for-losing-on-mortgage-crisis.html.
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protect their constituents from the dangers of financial meltdown in a globalized economy.105 As discussed above, they are
well-positioned to fight predatory lending and other abuses that
take place on a local level.106 When they have the ability and political will, AGs can work alone or together to battle Dodd-Frank
violations taking place in their jurisdictions.107 And as the mortgage settlement shows, AGs can also be effective on a national
scale when they work together across state lines.108
Through inter-state cooperation, state AGs can mount excellent responses to financial crises. However, even the best responses cannot restore Americans to the position they would be
in if these crises did not occur in the first place. The real goal is
effective prevention rather than response, and it is one that AGs
are simply not equipped to accomplish on their own or even together. No amount of coalition-building between AGs or negotiations with financial institutions can achieve what the United
States needs: comprehensive, effective consumer protection.
Constitutionally,109 and as a matter of sheer practicality, the
federal government must be involved in regulating inter-state
financial institutions and protecting consumers across the

105. See Totten, supra note 100, at 123–25 (noting the roadblock in “federal
agencies . . . preempt[ing] state laws aimed at the abusive lending practiced federal regulators refused to address,” including the federal government blocking
state anti-predatory lending laws and enforcement actions).
106. See CAROLYN CARTER, NAT’L CONSUMER LAW CTR., CONSUMER PROTECTION IN THE STATES: A 50-STATE EVALUATION OF UNFAIR AND DECEPTIVE
PRACTICES LAWS 10–11 (Mar. 2018), http://www.nclc.org/images/pdf/udap/
udap-report.pdf (“UDAP [Unfair and Deceptive Acts and Practices] statutes
bring consumer justice to the state, local, and individual level. They enable state
agencies [such as the Attorney General] to protect their citizens by responding
quickly to emerging frauds.”).
107. See Totten, supra note 100, at 145–49 (“Title X [of the Dodd-Frank Act]
authorizes a state attorney general to bring a civil action . . . . The forum provision in section 1042(a)(1) also has implications for bringing multi-state actions
to enforce federal consumer financial law. While subject to criticism, these actions have been a powerful tool in the hands of state attorneys general.”).
108. See Prior, supra note 33 (“The 16-month robo-signing saga ends with a
$26 billion settlement. Nearly all 50 states agreed to a deal with [mortgage servicers] Bank of America (BAC), JPMorgan Chase (JPM), Wells Fargo (WFC),
Ally Financial (GJM), and Citigroup (C).”).
109. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (“[The Congress shall have power] [t]o
regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States.”); West
Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186, 192 (1994) (“The Commerce Clause
also limits the power of [a state] . . . to adopt regulations that discriminate
against interstate commerce.”).
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United States.110 Recovering from the crisis required a systemic,
national response.111 Ensuring that such a preventable catastrophe does not reoccur will require more coordinated oversight, not
less. Much has changed since 2008, but the tendency of large
corporations to focus singularly on profits, without considering
consumer well-being or the overall health of the economy, has
not.112 In many respects, this drive seems to be stronger than it
has ever been before.113 There is an ever-present risk that big
companies will once again grind the economy into the ground to
make a quick buck. Americans deserve holistic state and federal
oversight that will protect them from the danger of repeating the
most disastrous financial meltdowns in U.S. history, and they
should demand no less.
CONCLUSION
The current administration’s objective to dissolve many
post-crisis laws, especially those that have proved favorable for
110. For instance, the federal government’s response to the Great Depression assisted in the financial recovery and contributed numerous economic policy innovations which remain critical even today, including the Securities Act
of 1933, the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and the Social Security Act of
1935. Ellen Terrell, The New Deal at 80+, LIBR. CONGRESS, BUS. REFERENCE
SERVICES (May 2009), https://www.loc.gov/rr/business/businesshistory/March/
newdeal.html; The Great Depression and the New Deal (1929 to 1941), U.S. EMBASSY & CONSULATE KOREA, https://kr.usembassy.gov/education-culture/
infopedia-usa/history/great-depression-new-deal-1929-1941.
111. See generally Chart Book: The Legacy of the Great Recession, CTR. ON
BUDGET & POL’Y PRIORITIES (Feb. 12, 2019), https://www.cbpp.org/research/
economy/chart-book-the-legacy-of-the-great-recession (noting “the course of the
economy following that recession [from December 2007 to June 2009] against
the background of how deep a hole the recession created—and how much deeper
that hole would have been without the financial stabilization and fiscal stimulus
policies enacted in late 2008 and early 2009”); Martin Wolf, How Barack Obama
Rescued the U.S. Economy, FIN. TIMES (Jan. 10, 2017), https://www.ft.com/
content/b5b764cc-d657-11e6-944b-e7eb37a6aa8e (noting that in the wake of the
Great Recession, “[t]he Obama administration implemented a number of important fiscal measures. . . . The administration also restored the financial sector faster than expected and carried out a highly successful rescue of the car
industry”).
112. See Rebecca M. Henderson, What Would It Take to Get Businesses to
Focus Less on Shareholder Value?, HARV. BUS. REV. (Aug. 21, 2018), https://
hbr.org/2018/08/what-would-it-take-to-get-businesses-to-focus-less-on
-shareholder-value (“Most public companies maximize shareholder value most
of the time because they’re afraid they will be fired if they don’t and they believe
they will get rich if they do. As long as firms are running scared of activist investors and CEO pay is tightly linked to the value of the firm, managers are
going to seek to maximize the firm’s stock price.”).
113. N.Y. Times Editorial Bd., supra note 96.
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consumers, is ill-advised. Reviving the economy from the economic crisis required transparent policy making and institutional accountability. Dismantling these policies will destroy the
foundation upon which the United States has restored and maintained a healthy economy. In the years following the crisis, state
AGs led efforts to address consumer protection, especially in financial services. Although the circumstances today are different
than those of ten years ago, similar action remains necessary.
Consumers must know the resources available for their protection and how to access those resources. In addition, consumers
should look to their leaders to take groundbreaking legal action
and implement legislative solutions aimed at consumer protection, and expect that more protections can be implemented and
enforced by a federal bureau—regardless of its title.

